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I'd like to begin by correcting a slight error on my part. The overview for this paper 
incorrectly claims that interpretation is a purely linguistic skill. If that were the case, 
then language would be impossible because we would be incapable of interpreting 
any of the nonverbal gestures and communicative techniques that necessarily 
precede language. Instead what I intend to discuss is expressed much more clearly 
in the abstract. 
 
Despite the fact that we commonly refer to artworks as “meaningful” things, this 
is not to say that meaning is an objective property analogous to size or shape. If 
meaning is not a physical property then it follows that it can only be a way of 
using things, of treating them as if they were imbued with features that they do 
not actually possess. Meaning is thus an attribution in which we agree through 
social consensus to use objects as tokens of power, prestige, celebration, 
explanation, instruction and so on. I argue that such symbolic procedures 
originate in practices of tool-use in which tools are commonly employed in 
various different ways depending on context and opportunity. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to show that the ability to interpret artworks and 
more generally to ascribe meanings is a highly sophisticated cultural capacity 
and, more specifically, a verbal skill dependent upon a network of symbolic 
resources and techniques that only a socially evolved linguistic culture can 
provide and enable. 
 
So my principal focus will be on our skills of ascription, attribution and predication 
and the extent to which these symbolising practices are central to the interpretation 
of meanings and intentions (including the ascription of psychological attributes to 
individuals based upon the interpretation of their actions). It is my view that these 
skills have their ancestral origins in longstanding social practices of exchange and 
tool-use in which objects are imbued with functions and values which transform their 
identity but leave their causal properties untouched. 
 
There is considerable debate within current ethological research regarding the 
capacity of nonverbal animals to interpret intentions: to have a Theory of Mind. The 
evidence so far gathered is insufficiently conclusive but what is clear is that the 
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capacity to interpret intentions requires the ability to respond to the perceptible 
behaviour of another creature as if it symbolised, indicated or referred to a 
disposition, attribute or propensity on the part of the individual concerned. This is a 
skill that improves with practice, and the interpretation of artworks and other artifacts 
of culture — narratives in particular — is one of the ways in which we humans 
develop and refine this skill. 
  
Artworks are a means both of showing and of telling. My aim is to explain how in 
every instance of telling, an artwork is treated as a symbolic entity situated within a 
wider system of socially negotiated references, codes and concepts. This is not to 
say that language is our only means of intelligently negotiating the world. But it is to 
say that the symbolic system of representation, of which language is almost entirely 
comprised, is the very same system by which we take any object or artwork to mean 
whatever we take it to mean. 
  
Why is this important? There are two reasons. The first is a point of clarity because it 
may not be immediately obvious that artworks mean what they mean by precisely 
the same strategy of representation as language. 
Secondly, important insights emerge as a consequence of clearly distinguishing 
between the purely verbal strategies of representation of language and the purely 
nonverbal strategies of representation that allow us to show but not to tell and to 
interpret what things are of, from and for but not what they are about. 
  
Ultimately though, this paper is concerned with the evolutionary emergence of the 
practice of symbolisation as a communicative tool. It is my speculative contention 
that without such practices, the capacity to interpret the intentions of others — the 
capacity to ascribe psychological predicates to them — would be impossible. 
  
So, what is it to symbolise something? 
  
Symbols are a type of representational stand-in. They employ a form of substitution 
in which we use one thing to represent another, even though the two things 
concerned need have nothing in common. I can use anything to symbolise anything 
else, so long as the people with whom I am communicating know the substitutive 
rule I am using. It is for this reason that all symbolic systems are reliant upon rules. 
Without rules for their use, objects and behaviours are simply whatever they are; 
they are merely bundles of properties. 
  
At the Olympic Games, sportswomen and sportsmen represent their countries of 
origin. Likewise, the medals they accumulate represent their sporting 
accomplishments. It may not be obvious, but the word "medal" stands in relation to 
the disk of gold, silver or bronze in precisely the same way that the medal stands in 
relation to the concepts of attainment, achievement and success. Likewise, when we 
attribute meanings to works of art, we draw upon socially negotiated conventions of 
signification. 
  
It is important to note that meaning is always an attribution and never an attribute of 
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things. A meaningful silence is not a silence capable of being emptied. Nor is a 
meaningful absence an absence with additional ingredients. 
  
Things are meaningful not because they have special characteristics or attributes but 
because we do. The capacity to ascribe meaning to things is a sophisticated skill that 
must be learned through discursive interaction and the acquisition of techniques and 
conventions that have been accumulated over millennia and that continue to develop 
and change. To "read" an object or artwork — to be capable of articulating what it 
might mean — is to have something to say about it: something to tell. 
  
In the same way that meaning is only ever ascribed to objects and states of affairs, 
psychological attributes like believing, thinking and intending can only be intelligibly 
attributed to perceivers.  When we say such things as “The sign says that the speed 
limit is 30mph.” we do not mean to suggest that the sign intends its message. Signs 
are intended but they do not have intentions. Likewise, we do not suppose that the 
bullet, or the gun that propelled it, is responsible for the shot fired. Intention is not a 
measurable property of things or agents – it can only be inferred on the basis of the 
behavior of perceivers (including any representations they may produce). This is why 
the question of intention is such a vexed and much disputed issue in the arts, as well 
as in numerous other fields of human interest (law being an obvious example). 
 
The Interpretation of Objects 
 
In his 1985 essay "On the Interpretation of Prehistoric Rock Art" , Australian art 
theorist Donald Brook poses an interpretative problem that can be put in the 
following way: there are two stick figures on a cave wall. One is bigger than the 
other. For the people who did this, do these figures match a little person and a big 
person? Do they symbolise an important person and an unimportant person? Or do 
they simulate two people of the same size situated at different distances from their 
notional perceiver? Brook writes: 
 
The dismal fact is that we cannot interpret representations from any "first principles," 
abstracted totally from the cultural context of origin, in order to infer what that cultural 
context must have been. The best we can do, most cautiously, is to use them in 
conjunction with some more or less hazardous pure hypotheses about the general 
tendencies of human beings and the specific nature of the society we are 
interpreting. (1985)  
 
Brook's point is worth further consideration. Imagine that we gave a hammer to 
someone who had never seen one before. It seems very likely that they would 
quickly determine that the hammer is good for pounding things. Now imagine how 
this same hammer might be interpreted by a non-human creature with the equivalent 
of human intelligence and a completely different morphology — the shape of a horse 
for example. Without some idea of the creatures for which hammers are made or the 
kinds of activities to which our tools are put, the hammer would present an 
impossible interpretive puzzle, unsolvable even by the kinds of "ready-to-hand" 
manipulation discussed by Heidegger (1962). For Heidegger, a tool like a hammer 
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"has a usability that belongs to it essentially", a "'towards-which' for which it is 
usable." In Heidegger's view, tools are best understood through use — through being 
"ready-to-hand". Artist and Heidegger scholar, Barbara Bolt (2006) puts it like this: 
 
The kind of being that a tool or material possesses comes to light in the context of 
handlability (sic). I can look at pots of different coloured paints, a camera or a 
computer screen and take pleasure in contemplating them, but it is only in use that 
they begin to reveal their potential. I can lay out my brushes and set a fresh canvas 
before me, but until I actually begin to work with them in making a painting I can not 
understand their being. 
 
In the context of human practices — of tool use and manipulation in particular — it is 
true that hammers are ready-to-hand in ways that make them extremely well suited 
for the tasks to which we put them, but I hope the example of the intelligent non-
human creature makes it clear that the notion of a "towards-which" that "belongs to 
[the hammer] essentially" is not necessarily the case. In fact, a hammer is only a 
hammer by virtue of the specific human techniques that instantiate its hammer-hood. 
Without these embodied procedures, the hammer might be used in innumerable 
other ways but in each case its identity would be significantly shaped by its 
integration within what Wittgenstein called a "form of life". By this I do not simply 
mean a culture, I mean a broader conception of the full gamut of biological and 
morphological features, strengths and weaknesses which typify our species as a 
form of life.  
 
It should be clear then that our interpretations of the world are significantly influenced 
not only by our culturally and genetically acquired skills but also by our biological 
strengths and weaknesses. If our sensory capacities were infallible, then no single 
object would ever be mistaken for another and the whole extraordinary spectacle of 
nonverbal representations, for example, would be impossible. 
  
In his book “The Limits of Interpretation,” Umberto Eco writes: "But I confess that it is 
frequently very hard to distinguish between use and interpretation." 
  
Eco opens up what I think is a significant insight here. To interpret something as 
having a use is not exactly a symbolic act, but it is what we might call a proto-
symbolic act. This is to say that to interpret an object as having a dual identity is a 
crucial step towards a very particular form of symbolisation that we might call 
“artifactual symbolisation.” Simple forms of behavioural symbolisation are very widely 
observed in nature but the production of symbolic artefacts — of meaningful tokens 
and tools — that are valued by other members of the species is unheard of outside 
human culture.  
 
In a 2010 paper, on the co-evolution of tools and minds, Ben Jeffares writes: 
 
“Tools start to play a role in the world of hominin that is ubiquitous in modern 
environments. Cultural products – tools – signal, buffer, and become available 
as means to reading the capacities of others. In a community of individuals 
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such as the Erectines, who were without full language faculties, tools become 
important communication devices.”  
 
Dennis Dutton's recent work on the evolutionary emergence of our concept of beauty 
corroborates this view. For Dutton our predilection for certain kinds of objects and 
material forms has a significant evolutionary basis in our long history of tool use. 
Speaking of the stone tools that our ancestors were already crafting 2.5 million years 
ago, he states: 
  
Hand axes mark an evolutionary advance in human history -- tools fashioned to 
function as what Darwinians call "fitness signals" -- that is to say, displays that 
are performances like the peacock's tail, except that, unlike hair and feathers, 
the hand axes are consciously cleverly crafted. Competently made hand axes 
indicated desirable personal qualities -- intelligence, fine motor control, planning 
ability, conscientiousness and sometimes access to rare materials. Over tens of 
thousands of generations, such skills increased the status of those who 
displayed them and gained a reproductive advantage over the less capable. 
 
So in conclusion, if my characterisation of the basic procedure of symbolic 
representation is correct, then the capacity to ascribe meanings to objects or 
intentions to agents are skills that require the ability to interpret objects and actions 
symbolically. 
  
The purpose of this paper has been to show that interpretation falls into two quite 
different categories. Interpreting the meaning of things is a skill that we learn as soon 
as we begin to name things but the capacity to ascribe psychological predicates to 
agents is a much more sophisticated skill. One of the most common ways that we 
are introduced to such skills is obviously through narrative description as children. 
Narratives introduce us to the rudiments of logic as these are inscribed into our 
primary system of communication. But narratives also enable us to speculate and to 
reason about the intentions of others. In order to achieve such sophisticated 
inferential techniques, we already need to be competent not only in the skill of 
symbol attribution but in the more sophisticated procedures of symbol manipulation. 
It has been my aim in the preceding discussion to show why I believe that the 
manipulation of symbols has been significantly assisted by our ancestral history as 
tool users and as producers and users of symbolic objects. 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to show that interpretation falls into three distinct 
categories. Using objects for. Retain purposes can be regarded as a basic form of 
symbolisation from which the capacity to ascribe meanings and psychological 
attributes derives. 
 
Interpreting the meaning of things is a skill that we learn as soon as we begin to 
name things but the capacity to ascribe psychological predicates to agents is a much 
more sophisticated skill. One of the most common ways that we are introduced to 
such skills is obviously through narrative description as children. Narratives introduce 
us to the rudiments of logic as these are inscribed into our primary system of 
©Jim Hamlyn, 2015. FOR REFERENCE USE ONLY. For bibliographical 
information please consult the author.  
 
communication. But narratives also enable us to speculate and to reason about the 
intentions of others. In order to achieve such sophisticated inferential techniques, we 
already need to be competent not only in the skill of symbol attribution but in the 
more sophisticated procedures of symbol manipulation. It has been my aim in the 
preceding discussion to show why I believe that the manipulation of symbols has 
been significantly assisted by our ancestral history as tool users and as producers 
and users of symbolic objects. 
 
 
